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INVITED PAPER Special Section on Information and Communication System Security
Time-Bound Hierarchical Key Assignment: An Overview∗
Wen Tao ZHU†a), Robert H. DENG††b), Jianying ZHOU†††c), and Feng BAO†††d), Nonmembers
SUMMARY The access privileges in distributed systems can be eﬀec-
tively organized as a partial-order hierarchy that consists of distinct security
classes, and the access rights are often designated with certain temporal re-
strictions. The time-bound hierarchical key assignment problem is to assign
distinct cryptographic keys to distinct security classes according to their
privileges so that users from a higher class can use their class key to derive
the keys of lower classes, and these keys are time-variant with respect to
sequentially allocated temporal units called time slots. In this paper, we
present the involved principle, survey the state of the art, and particularly,
look into two representative approaches to time-bound hierarchical key as-
signment for in-depth case studies.
key words: information security, access control, time-bound hierarchical
cryptographic key management
1. Introduction
1.1 The Hierarchical Access Control Problem
With the rapid growth and pervasive deployment of informa-
tion systems, sharing resources among multiple users over
an open channel has become widespread. Access control on
user permissions is a fundamental issue in any system that
manages distributed resources. In this paper, we consider a
multilevel security scenario, where users and data of an in-
formation system are organized into a hierarchy composed
of disjoint security classes. Such a hierarchical structure
arises from the fact that users in a distributed system may
have distinct rights to access diﬀerent parts or depths of the
resources in the system, and some users may have higher
privileges (in other terms, security levels or clearances) than
others. In the real world there are many examples of this
kind of hierarchy, such as in business administration, gov-
ernment departments, diplomatic corps, and the military.
A hierarchical key assignment (KA) is to assign a distinct
cryptographic key to each class so that users attached to any
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“base” class can also derive the keys of “lower” classes. As
confidential data are classified into such security classes,
they can be protected with respective encryption keys us-
ing a symmetric cipher, where the decryption operation asks
a user for the same encryption key so as to recover the data.
Let there be m security classes C, 1 ≤  ≤ m in the hi-
erarchy partially ordered according to a binary relation “”.
In this partial-order hierarchy (C,), C j ≺ Ci means the se-
curity level of class C j is lower than that of class Ci (or, Ci
dominates C j), and C j  Ci allows for the additional case
of j = i. Formally, the hierarchical KA problem is to as-
sign a key K to each class C, so that a user assigned to her
base class Ci can use the issued Ki to derive any Kj (thus to
recover the data in C j), if and only if C j  Ci.
The partial-order hierarchy (C,) can be mapped to a
directed acyclic graph (DAG), where each class corresponds
to a vertex and there is a directed edge from Ci to C j if and
only if C j  Ci. This graph can be simplified by eliminating
all self-loops and edges which can be implied by the prop-
erty of the transitive closure. Hence for such a refined DAG,
an edge from Ci to class C j implies that C j ≺ Ci and there is
no C such that C j ≺ C ≺ Ci. In this case, we say C j is an
immediate descendant of Ci, and Ci is an immediate ances-
tor of C j. Accordingly, if C j ≺ Ci but C j is not an immediate
descendant of Ci, there must be a directed path from Ci to
class C j connected by two or more directed edges. A class
may have multiple immediate ancestors (e.g., in Fig. 1, C6
has two immediate ancestors C2 and C3).
1.2 From Class Keys to Session Keys
In many commercial applications, there is an explicit tem-
poral restriction so that a user is attached to her base class
for only a limited period of time consisting of a contiguous
set of time slots. Let the time dimension be discretized into
even units (i.e., time slots or intervals) t = 0, 1, · · · , z. Here
the maximum index z should not be considered as a limi-
tation of the access control, as the system lifetime may be
arbitrarily large. For instance, if each time slot represents a
second, z = 3.156 × 107 denotes roughly 1 year; if each slot
represents a week, z = 5217 denotes roughly 100 years.
Now, instead of with the previous Ki, let the data clas-
sified into Ci at time t be encrypted with a volatile key ki,t.
Such periodical update of the encryption key (i.e., employ-
ing a dynamic key instead of a static one) implies enhanced
security against cryptanalysis, and thus is also beneficial
to applications where there are no explicit temporal con-
Copyright c© 2010 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers
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straints. Incorporating the temporal feature, we say the class
key Ki is instantiated with a series of session keys {ki,t}, by
specifying:
• The static Ki for Ci is only used for generating session
keys {ki,t} as well as deriving the time-invariant class
key Kj of any lower class C j ≺ Ci, but never for actual
data encryption.
• Only the time-based ki,t is employed by the aforemen-
tioned symmetric cipher for real data protection with
respect to security class Ci, from session to session in-
dexed by the time slot t.
A typical application of such time-bound hierarchical
KA scheme is the digital pay TV system, where the ser-
vice provider organizes the channels into several possible
subscription packages for users’ choices [1]. For example
in Fig. 1 there are four independent TV channels C5, C6, C7,
and C8, and subscription to package C3 allows for the access
to two of them (C6 and C8), while subscription to package
C1 allows for all. Another example is the electronic journal
subscription system, where a user can subscribe to any com-
bination of the available journals within a chosen period of
time [2].
Assume a trusted central authority (CA) manages the
key assignment. Upon registration, a user authorized to her
base class Ci (1 ≤ i ≤ m) for time [t1 · · · t2] (0 ≤ t1 ≤
t2 ≤ z) is assigned by the CA certain private primitive de-
noted as I(i, t1, t2). She should only be able to compute
from I(i, t1, t2) the session keys {k j,t} satisfying C j  Ci and
t1 ≤ t ≤ t2, thus only authorized to access the data stored in
class C j at time t. The session key derivation is constrained
by both the class relation and the time bounds (t1 and t2), and
the derived k j,t should equal the instance of the class key Kj
at time t. The CA is active only at user registration. No
private channel exists between the CA and the user after the
issuance of the private primitive, i.e., the user should derive
k j,t from only I(i, t1, t2) and certain static public information,
with no interaction with the CA.
In this paper, we refer interchangeably to time-based,
time-bound, time-dependent, and time-variant. The rest of
this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the
literature. Sections 3 & 4 review and analyze two repre-
sentative time-bound hierarchical KA schemes. Concluding
remarks are in Sect. 5.
2. Time-Bound Hierarchical KA: A Survey
In the literature, the hierarchical cryptographic KA problem
was first studied by Akl and Taylor [3] in 1983, where the
temporal consideration was yet unavailable. A recent mod-
ification of the Akl-Taylor scheme [3] can be found in [1],
where a technique termed “merging” is introduced so that a
solution more eﬃcient than the original one [3] is possible;
even the multilevel security hierarchy itself may not need to
be constructed.
In 2002, Tzeng proposed a time-dependent hierarchi-
cal KA scheme [4] as an extension of the Akl-Taylor ap-
proach [3] with an additional access control on the temporal
dimension technically enabled with the Lucas sequence [5],
which is similar to the RSA public-key cryptosystem [6].
The scheme has some interesting applications such as secure
broadcasting and cryptographic key backup [4]. Bertino
et al. immediately adopted Tzeng’s scheme and showed that
the scheme [4] is readily applicable to secure broadcasting
of XML documents [7]. However, this first time-bound hi-
erarchical KA scheme [4] was soon found to be vulnerable
to the collusion attack. In [8], Yi and Ye showed that three
users can conspire to infer some session keys that even a
combination of them is not entitled to, but no security fix
was proposed. We note that the identified security breach
is irrelevant to the Lucas sequence [5] featured in Tzeng’s
scheme [4], although there are certain known weaknesses
associated with the sequence [9].
In 2004, Chien proposed the second time-bound hierar-
chical KA scheme employing a tamper-resistant device [10],
which is a direct extension to the time-invariant hierarchical
KA scheme earlier proposed by him and Jan [11]. The time-
dependent scheme [10] is quite diﬀerent from Tzeng’s [4]
and greatly improves the computational performance. Inter-
estingly, later Yi again showed that Chien’s scheme is sub-
ject to the collusion attack, where again three users can con-
spire to acquire some unauthorized session keys [12], but
in a manner not as sophisticated as in his previous collu-
sion attack [8] against Tzeng’s scheme [4]. Again Yi did not
propose any security fix, though several very lightweight
remedies are possible [13]. Although this time Bertino
et al. took into consideration Yi’s three-party collusion at-
tack [12] and proposed in [14] a security fix, their approach
requires that the tamper-resistant device additionally sup-
port elliptic-curve cryptography, and thus is far more com-
plex and cost-expensive than straightforward improvements
on Chien’s scheme [10] such as those demonstrated by De
Santis et al. [13]. Moreover, a complex solution does not al-
ways make for security [15], and the heavyweight security
fix presented by Bertino et al. [14] was recently found to be
still vulnerable to the collusion attack [16], where even only
two conspirers are suﬃcient to break the fix.
In 2005, Yeh proposed a new time-bound hierarchi-
cal KA scheme [2] based on the RSA public-key crypto-
system [6], which is claimed to be resilient to collusion at-
tacks. Unfortunately, Ateniese et al. soon identified that
the scheme [2] is insecure against a two-party collusion at-
tack [17], and the attack even aﬀects a later work by Yeh
published in 2008 [18]. There is also a scheme [19] very
similar to Yeh’s [2], and is found to be vulnerable to a two-
party collusion attack [20] as well.
In 2006, Wang and Laih proposed an alternative im-
plementation of the Akl-Taylor scheme [3] employing the
so-called merging technique [1]. The technique not only is
applicable to the spatial dimension (i.e., the partial-order
hierarchy) but also can be extended to construct a time-
bound KA scheme based on a two-dimensional “global hi-
erarchy”, which is the Cartesian product [4] of the security
class hierarchy and the virtual time hierarchy. At the same
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Table 1 Brief summary of time-bound hierarchical KA schemes in the literature.
Scheme Security Related Notes
Akl-Taylor [3] provable [1], [4] time-invariant; provably secure with the strong RSA assumption
Tzeng [4] compromised [8] [7] Lucas sequence [5] has known weaknesses [9]; ei generation defective [21]
Chien [10] compromised [12] [11], [13], [14] fix with security proof available in full version of [16]
Bertino et al. [14] compromised [16] fix with security proof available in full version of [16]
Yeh [2] compromised [17] [18]
Huang-Chang [19] compromised [20]
Wang-Laih [1] no formal proof
Tzeng [21] no formal proof ei’s become pairwise relatively prime (thus slightly diﬀerent from [3], [4])
Ateniese et al. [17] provable contributes the first formal framework and two provably secure schemes
Atallah et al. [22] provable [23] incorporates time-dependent capabilities to existent key management
Briscoe [24] no formal proof [25] purely time-based, no security hierarchy
time, Tzeng proposed a secure data access system [21] based
on an anonymous authentication scheme and his new time-
based hierarchical KA scheme, the latter among which ap-
pears immune to collusion attacks. In the same year, the
first result that provides a formal framework for time-bound
hierarchical KA schemes was given by Ateniese et al. [17],
where the notion of security for such KA schemes is for-
malized and two provably secure solutions are also pro-
posed. It is worth noting that, both Tzeng’s new time-bound
KA scheme [21] and Ateniese et al.’s provably secure so-
lutions [17] consider the spatial hierarchy and the tempo-
ral dimension in an integrated, transformed view like the
“global hierarchy” [1]. Therefore, the underlying ideas of
these three works [1], [17], [21] in 2006 bear certain similar-
ities.
The study on time-dependent hierarchical key assign-
ment originated from the time-invariant KA problem in
a partial-order hierarchy [3], but recently the research on
purely time-based KA has become a topic of interest, where
the notion of security classes is absent, i.e., the considered
multilevel security reduces to a setting with only a universal
class. For example, Atallah et al. presented in 2007 a prov-
ably secure approach that can incorporate time-dependent
capabilities to existent key management schemes [22]. If the
time is regarded as a single dimension, their solution can be
extended to higher dimensions, and a proof of concept with
respect to two dimensions is presented in [23] in the geo-
spatial setting. In 2008, Srivatsa et al. followed the same
idea, and applied Briscoe’s time-dependent KA scheme [24]
to three dimensions, in a similar context of location-based
broadcast services [25].
The topic of time-bound hierarchical KA has been
widely discussed since 2002 [4]. A major problem observed
is that, a proposed scheme may soon be found subject to
certain collusion attacks (e.g., [8] against [4], both [12] and
[13] against [10], [20] against [17], [19] against both [2] and
[18], and the recent [16] against [14]), though sometimes
a corresponding remedy may be available. Another prob-
lem is as follows. Typically, these schemes either involve
public-key operations (modular exponentiations following
the Akl-Taylor style [3]) or alike computations (the Lucas
sequence in [4], and even bilinear maps in [17]), or require
the protection by a tamper-resistant device (sometimes even
both, as in Bertino et al.’s heavyweight security fix [14]).
However, public-key (i.e., asymmetric) operations can be
about a thousand times slower than symmetric ones [6], and
commodity (particularly, low-cost) devices usually are not
equipped with tamper-resistant casings. Hence, existent
time-bound hierarchical KA schemes in general may not be
very practical, and more research eﬀort is needed before this
security technique can be adopted in pervasive and emerging
applications.
More recently proposed schemes [1], [17], [21] are be-
lieved to be resilient to collusion attacks, and may even
achieve provable security. However, understanding the un-
derlying constructions needs a heavy research background
in cryptology, and they may not be easily implemented due
to their intrinsic complexity (hence they are not topic of in-
terest in the following sections). For example, in [1] the
Akl-Taylor style [3] modular exponentiation is applied to the
so termed “global hierarchy”, which is the Cartesian prod-
uct [4] of the original partial-order hierarchy and the con-
ceived time hierarchy. Similar approach is adopted in [21].
These two schemes not only are computation-intensive, but
also ask for a significant amount of public storage. In [17],
two provably-secure time-bound hierarchical KA schemes
were proposed, one based on symmetric encryption and the
other based on bilinear maps. While the former scheme
seems preferable in terms of processing cost, it asks for a
prohibitively large public storage space scaling as O(m2z3),
where m is the number of security classes in the partial-
order hierarchy and z denotes the system lifetime. Note that
z3 may be enormous (recall the examples in Sect. 1.2). In
[22], Atallah et al. showed that it is possible to create a
full-fledged hierarchical access control scheme with time-
bound capabilities, but the proposed scheme also requires a
formidable amount of public information.
We summarize the literature survey in Table 1. Next,
we review two time-bound hierarchical KA schemes of in-
terest proposed by Tzeng [4] and Chien [10], respectively.
We provide a didactic viewpoint concerning not only their
security but also pragmatic issues like practicality. We also
present technical challenges and indicate possible directions
for future research.
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3. Tzeng’s Scheme
3.1 Review of the Scheme
In 2002, Tzeng proposed the first time-bound hierarchical
KA scheme [4] by introducing a time-based dimension to
the Akl-Taylor scheme [3]. Following our notation, Tzeng’s
scheme can be considered as a generalization of previous
ones where the private primitive I(i, t1, t2) assigned by the
CA to a user simply reduces to a single Ki, the time-invariant
class key of his base class. Intuitively, the time-variant ex-
tension can be made by requiring each user to memorize
(t2 − t1 + 1) instances of each class key assigned to his base
class Ci and all the classes lower down in the partial-order
hierarchy. However, storing O(t2 − t1) keys is not realistic
as z may be arbitrarily large. Tzeng not only introduced the
time-bound concept, but also showed that it is possible to
find a solution far more elegant than the straightforward ex-
tension whose storage expense may be on the order of mz
in the worst case. In Tzeng’s scheme [4] the user private
primitive I(i, t1, t2) only consists of a very small quantity of
information, whose size is independent of either the num-
ber of classes that the user can access (i.e., |{C j|C j  Ci}|)
or the number of authorized time slots (i.e., (t2 − t1 + 1)).
However, the price is that, the derivation of the session key
is very costly. Next, we look into its mathematical details.
Initialization. Assume that a partial-order hierarchy con-
sists of m disjoint classes Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ m ordered by the binary
relation “”, for a lifetime numbered as slots 0 throughout
z. The CA chooses two pairs of large strong primes (p1, q1)
and (p2, q2), and computes n1 = p1q1 and n2 = p2q2. The
CA also selects two random numbers a and b, 1 < a < n1
and 1 < b < n2. Numbers p1, q1, n1, and a are for the partial-
order hierarchy, while numbers p2, q2, n2, and b are for the
Lucas sequence [5] implementing the time-bound attribute.
• For the partial-order hierarchy, the CA randomly
chooses g1, g2, e1, e2, · · · , em ∈ Z∗φ(n1), and computes
h1, h2, d1, d2, · · · , dm such that g1h1 ≡ g2h2 ≡ eidi ≡ 1
(mod φ(n1)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
• Concerning the time dimension, the CA randomly
chooses f1 and f2, and associates with each t ∈ [0 · · · z]
a wt = Vf z−t1 f t2 (b), which we call the instance secret.
The Lucas sequence {V(x)}∞=0 regarding x ∈ Z+, is de-
fined over Zn2 as V(x) = V−1(x) − V−2(x) mod n2
for  ≥ 2, with the initial conditions V0(x) = 2
and V1(x) = x mod n2. One of its properties is
V1 (V2 (x)) = V12 (x).
Public information. A one-way hash function H and pa-
rameters (n1, g1, g2, e1, e2, · · · , em), (n2, f1, f2).
Class key. The CA computes K0 = ad1d2···dm mod n1, and
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the class key of Ci is defined as Ki =
K
∏
CCi e
0 mod n1. Figure 1 illustrates the class key assign-
ment for a possible partial-order hierarchy.
Session key. The encryption key for class Ci (i.e., the in-
stance of Ki) at time t ∈ [0 · · · z] is:
Fig. 1 A partial-order hierarchy of m = 8 classes following the Akl-
Taylor KA [3]. All keys are modulo an RSA modulus.
ki,t = H(γ(i, t),wt), where γ(i, t) = Kh
t
1h
z−t
2
i mod n1. (1)
Private primitive. When a user is to be attached to the
base class Ci for the period of time [t1 · · · t2], he is given
I(i, t1, t2) = (Kh
t2
1 h
z−t1
2
i mod n1,Vf z−t21 f t12 (b)) = (IK , IV ), which
is always of a constant size (n1 + n2).
Key derivation. Given I(i, t1, t2) = (IK , IV ), the user can
derive any k( j, t) if C j  Ci and t1 ≤ t ≤ t2. To do so, he first
computes (including inferring Kj from Ki):
I
gt2−t1 g
t−t1
2
∏
CCi ,CC j e
K mod n1
= (K
∏
CCi ,CC j e
i )h
t2
1 h
z−t1
2 h
t−t2
1 h
t1−t
2 mod n1
= Kh
t
1h
z−t
2
j mod n1 = γ( j, t), and
Vf t2−t1 f t−t12 (IV ) = Vf t2−t1 f t−t12 f z−t21 f t12 (b) = wt.
Then, following (1) he can derive k j,t = H(γ( j, t),wt).
3.2 Yi and Ye’s Attack against the Scheme
In [8], Yi and Ye demonstrated a sophisticated collusion at-
tack essentially against the time-bound property of Tzeng’s
scheme [4], while the partial-order property inherited from
the Akl-Taylor scheme [3] is not challenged. The aﬀected
element in the user private primitive I(i, t1, t2) = (IK , IV ) is
IK , while IV based on the Lucas sequence [5] appears to be
not responsible for the identified security breach. Although
cryptologists have warned against certain applications of the
Lucas sequence [9], so far there is no reported weakness
concerning its adoption in the time-bound KA scheme [4].
The collusion attack [8] can be generalized as follows.
Assume there are three users A with I(a, t1, t2), B with
I(b, t3, t4), and C with I(c, t5, t6), where t5 ≤ t2 ≤ t3 ≤ t6.
The security class of concern is any C j satisfying C j  Ca,
C j  Cb, but C j  Cc. Following [4], A can compute γ( j, t2)
and B can compute γ( j, t3) (recall formula (1)). The point is
that, it is feasible to infer γ( j, t) for any t ∈ [t2 · · · t3], from
γ( j, t2) and γ( j, t3) [8]. Therefore, with such γ( j, t) oﬀered
by A and B, and the instance secret wt computed by C (note
that [t2 · · · t3] ⊆ [t5 · · · t6]), the three inner attackers can fol-
low formula (1) to infer k( j, t) for t2 ≤ t ≤ t3, which even a
combination of them is not entitled to.
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3.3 Discussions
Bertino et al. directly adopted Tzeng’s scheme to build an
access control mechanism for XML documents [7], and thus
their mechanism is also subject to the above collusion at-
tack. However, in [8] Yi and Ye did not provide any remedy
to Tzeng’s scheme. We note for the user private primitive
I(i, t1, t2) = (IK , IV ), both IK and IV are time-bound, which
seems unnecessary; actually, sometimes complexity impairs
security [15]. Hence, a possible fix is to remove from the
vulnerable IK the time-dependent ingredient (the exponent
ht21 h
z−t1
2 ), resulting in IK = Ki mod n1. This way IK and IV ,
the two building blocks respectively addressing spatial class
designation and temporal restrictions, are decoupled, which
corresponds to clear separation of duty. In a nutshell, for-
mula (1) now becomes ki,t = H(Ki mod n1,wt). As we shall
see later, Chien’s scheme [10] exactly follows such a decou-
pled structure.
The above approach, however, is still subject to the fol-
lowing two-party collusion attack: if user A with I(a, t1, t2)
oﬀers the class key Ka mod n1 while user B with I(b, t3, t4)
oﬀers the instance secret wt for t3 ≤ t ≤ t4, they can easily
conspire to compute k(a, t) for t3 ≤ t ≤ t4 (also k(b, t) for
t1 ≤ t ≤ t2). Such collusion, which we call the interweav-
ing attack, violates the security policy. This can be elimi-
nated by introducing a tamper-resistant device. It computes
k( j, t) = H(Kj mod n1,wt) for C j  Ci and t1 ≤ t ≤ t2, from
I(i, t1, t2) = (IK , IV ) = (Ki mod n1,Vf z−t21 f t12 (b)) stored in the
device and some public information either stored locally or
available online, in such a secure manner that any stored se-
cret (e.g., IK or IV ) will not be revealed even to the device
owner. This way IK and IV are fully decoupled, as any inter-
weaving is impossible. We also note that, in cases where the
multilevel hierarchical characteristic is not needed (i.e., the
considered setting reduces to only a single security class),
the instance secret wt, in the absence of the tamper-resistant
device, can play the role of a time-bound session key.
As long as there is no weakness found regarding the us-
age of the Lucas sequence, the above remedy seems feasible.
However, in practice the tamper-resistant device may not
always be available. Besides the collusion attack, Tzeng’s
scheme has the disadvantage that the key derivation is very
expensive. Inherited from the Akl-Taylor time-invariant hi-
erarchical KA scheme [3], computing Kj from Ki for C j ≺
Ci involves expensive public-key operation (modular expo-
nentiation). At the same time, computing the Lucas se-
quence proves to be likewise expensive. Although there are
fast algorithms [5], each Lucas operation is roughly equiva-
lently expensive as a modular exponentiation [4]. Therefore,
the overall algorithm is computation-intensive. Although
Tzeng’s scheme [4] is eﬃcient in terms of storage and com-
munication, the heavy computational loads and implemen-
tation costs may limit its actual deployment.
Recall that Yi and Ye’s three-party collusion at-
tack [8] is only against the time-bound property of Tzeng’s
scheme [4], while the partial-order property is not chal-
lenged. However, we observe that there is some slight dif-
ference between the original Akl-Taylor scheme [3] and its
adoption in Tzeng’s scheme [4]. In Tzeng’s scheme, the
class keys are computed in the RSA setting [6], with the
modulus n1 = p1q1 and the random exponents ei ∈ Z∗φ(n1),
eidi ≡ 1 (mod φ(n1)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Consequently, in
[4] K0 = ad1d2···dm mod n1, and Ki = K
∏
CCi e
0 mod n1 for
1 ≤ i ≤ m. In the Akl-Taylor scheme [3], however, K0
is randomly chosen (i.e., information-theoretic), while each
class Ci is associated with a distinct prime ei. Although Ki
is computed from K0 in the same manner, Tzeng’s modifi-
cation complicates the generation of K0, as all the di’s in [4]
are actually unnecessary. Moreover, a subtle security breach
may arise regarding the selection of ei’s. Next, we discuss
this problem separately.
We begin with a very simple partial-order hierarchy
containing only three security classes C1, C2, and C3, where
C2 and C3 are both immediate descendants of C1 (hence C2
and C3 are independent of each other). Since C2  C1
and C3  C1, we have K2 = Ke1e30 mod n1 and K3 =
Ke1e20 mod n1. In most cases, randomly selecting ei ∈ Z∗φ(n1)
as in [4] does not lead to a problem. However, if one of e2
and e3 happens to be a divisor of the other (which can be
easily checked as all ei’s are public), say e2|e3, then users
in C3 can trivially compute the class key of an irrelevant
security class C2 by K2 = K
e3
e2
3 mod n1. The problem may
also occur in a more complicated (and possibly more realis-
tic) hierarchy. One can take Fig. 1 for example, where K5,
K6, K7, and K8 are four independent class keys; there might
be a similar security breach if the exponents e5, e6, e7, and
e8 are chosen without care. Therefore, although ei’s do not
necessarily need to be primes (but specified in the original
Akl-Taylor scheme [3] and derivatives like [1]), any of them
should not be a divisor of any else. This observation can be
attributed to Tang and Mitchell [20], though the actual target
of their attack is Huang and Chang’s scheme [19].
It is also worth noting that, later in Tzeng’s new
time-bound hierarchical KA scheme [21], K0 becomes
information-theoretic (thus no di’s), while (according to a
footnote in [21] but without any explanation) ei’s should
be pairwise relatively prime; the rest remains the same,
say Ki = K
∏
CCi e
0 mod n1, and thus Kj = K
∏
CCi ,CC j e
i
mod n1 for C j  Ci. Although looser than originally speci-
fied by Akl and Taylor [3], the unexplained requirement on
ei’s may still seem to be an overkill; that any of them is not
a divisor of any else seems suﬃcient for security. However,
we show the requirement is necessary by again considering
the example in Fig. 1. Suppose gcd(e6, e4e7e8) = 1. Then
a user in C4 knowing K4 = Ke1e2e3e5·e60 mod n1, and a user
in C6 knowing K6 = Ke1e2e3e5·e4e7e80 mod n1, can conspire
to infer Ke1e2e3e50 mod n1 following the merging idea [1],
essentially by employing the common modulus attack [6].
Assume e3|e4e7, say e3 = 15, e4 = 9, and e7 = 25.
Then, K3 = Ke1e2e5·e4e70 mod n1 can be easily derived from
Ke1e2e5·e30 mod n1, which is the class key of C3 but not in-
tended for even the coalition of C4 and C6. It is enough to
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deter such collusion attack by requiring the ei’s to be pair-
wise relatively prime.
4. Chien’s Scheme
4.1 Review of the Scheme
In 2004, Chien proposed the second time-bound hierarchi-
cal KA scheme [10] involving no expensive operations like
modular exponentiation or Lucas sequence. It actually ex-
tends his time-invariant KA protocol [11] featuring a refer-
ence table instead of following the Akl-Taylor style [3] with
a tamper-resistant device performing mainly one-way hash
functions. From [11] to [10], the introduced instance secret
wt is computed by the tamper-resistant device with a tech-
nique that can be termed as the dual directional hash chains,
which serves as the building block for the temporal restric-
tions.
Let H(x) be the result of applying a one-way hash
function H for  times to x. Then x,H(x),H2(x) · · · forms a
forward hash chain. Chien’s scheme [10] employs two hash
chains (a forward one and a reverse one), and is far more ef-
ficient than Tzeng’s scheme [4]. However, the computation
of the instance secret wt needs the protection by a tamper-
resistant device. Otherwise, two users may conspire to share
the “earlier” one of their forward chains and the “later” one
of their reverse chains to infer unauthorized instance secrets.
Note the Lucas sequence in [4] is not subject to such a col-
lusion. Therefore, compared with Tzeng’s scheme, Chien
additionally introduced a tamper-resistant device.
Next, we look into the nuts and bolts of Chien’s
scheme [10]. We follow the previous notation.
Initialization. The CA randomly selects a server secret key
X, two secret values a and b, and m keys Ki, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The
security class Ci, identified by IDi, is assigned the class key
Ki, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Public information. For each directed edge C j ≺ Ci
in the hierarchy, the CA publishes a reference ri j =
H(X‖IDi‖IDj‖Ki) ⊕ Kj on a public board, resulting in the
public reference table {ri j | C j ≺ Ci, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m}.
Session key. Compute wt with the dual hash chains. Then
the data in class Ci at time t is encrypted with:
ki,t = H(Ki ⊕ wt), where wt = Ht(a) ⊕ Hz−t(b). (2)
Private primitive. When a user is assigned to his base
class Ci for a period of time [t1 · · · t2], the CA distributes
Ki to the user through a secure channel. The CA also is-
sues the user a tamper-resistant device, in which X, Ht1 (a),
and Hz−t2 (b) are secretly stored (even inaccessible to the de-
vice owner). The device also contains non-confidential (but
readonly) information IDi and H. Therefore, I(i, t1, t2) =
(Ki,Ht1 (a),Hz−t2 (b)) is the user-specific private primitive (of
a constant size, similar to Tzeng’s scheme [4]).
Key derivation. With the tamper-resistant device, the user
entitled to I(i, t1, t2) can derive any k( j, t) for C j  Ci and
t1 ≤ t ≤ t2. For example, if C j = Ci, the user sim-
ply enters Ki into the device, which yields ki,t = H(Ki ⊕
Ht−t1 (Ht1 (a)) ⊕ Ht2−t(Hz−t2 (b))) complying with (2). Gener-
ally, assume the path from Ci (= Cθ , θ ≥ 2) to C j (= C1 ) is
C1 ≺ C2 ≺ · · · ≺ Cθ , where Cd is an immediate descent of
Cd+1 , 1 ≤ d ≤ θ−1. The user enters rθθ−1 , rθ−1θ−2 , · · · , r21 ,
IDθ (= IDi), IDθ−1 , · · · , ID2 , ID1 (= IDj), and Kθ = Ki into
the device, which sequentially computes:
Kθ−1 = rθθ−1 ⊕ H(X‖IDθ‖IDθ−1‖Kθ ),
Kθ−2 = rθ−1θ−2 ⊕ H(X‖IDθ−1‖IDθ−2‖Kθ−1 ), · · ·
Kj = K1 = r21 ⊕ H(X‖ID2‖ID1‖K2 ),
wt = Ht−t1 (Ht1 (a)) ⊕ Ht2−t(Hz−t2 (b)),
and k j,t = H(Kj ⊕ wt) following (2).
4.2 Yi’s Attack against the Scheme
In [12], Yi again demonstrated a three-party collusion at-
tack, which is against Chien’s scheme [10] and is gener-
alized as follows. Assume there are three users A with
I(a, t1, t2), B with I(b, t3, t4), and C with I(c, t5, t6), where Cc
is an immediate descendant of Cb but Ca  Cb. At first,
with the public reference rbc = H(X‖IDb‖IDc‖Kb) ⊕ Kc,
C knowing Kc can infer H(X‖IDb‖IDc‖Kb) = rbc ⊕ Kc
and forward it to B. Suppose A also forwards Ka to
B. Then B, as if going to derive kc,t for t3 ≤ t ≤ t4,
can enter into his tamper-resistant device the correct class
identifier IDc, his base class key Kb, but a crafted r′bc =
H(X‖IDb‖IDc‖Kb)⊕Ka. The device is then misled into com-
puting K′c = r′bc⊕H(X‖IDb‖IDc‖Kb) = (H(X‖IDb‖IDc‖Kb)⊕
Ka) ⊕ H(X‖IDb‖IDc‖Kb) = Ka, which appears to be still
within the combined knowledge of the three conspiring
users A, B, and C. However, the point is that, B’s device
can also compute wt for t3 ≤ t ≤ t4, and thus can yield
corresponding ka,t following (2). Obviously, such collu-
sion violates the intended security policy (unless [t3 · · · t4] ⊆
[t1 · · · t2]). In other words, it is easy for the three users to
acquire Ka’s instances beyond A’s authorized time period
[t1 · · · t2].
4.3 Discussions
This time, diﬀerent from the previous one [8], Yi’s at-
tack [12] against Chien’s scheme [10] actually targets the
partial-order property, while the time-bound property based
on the dual hash chains is not challenged. Note that with-
out the protection of the tamper-resistant device, a user with
I(i, 0, t1) and another user with I(i, t2, z) can collude to ac-
quire wt for any t in the entire system lifetime (and thus any
ki,t for 0 ≤ t ≤ z). This explains why the dual hash chains
should only be employed in a tamper-resistant device so as
to compose a secure solution to time-bound key manage-
ment. On the other hand, interestingly, Yi’s attack does not
aﬀect the time-invariant version [11] of Chien’s KA scheme,
as in that case the conspiring users cannot gain any more
than the combination of their respective privileges. How-
ever, when another dimension is introduced, as from [11] to
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[10], Yi exploited the partial-order property to launch an in-
terweaving attack (recall Sect. 3.3). Therefore, it seems that,
the combination of respectively secure building blocks does
not always result in an integration that is overall secure. This
is the lesson we learn from Chien’s scheme [10].
In Sect. 3.3 when proposing a possible security fix to
Tzeng’s scheme [4], we have pointed out that, the decoupled
structure ki,t = H(Ki mod n1,wt) should be implemented
in a tamper-resistant device such that IK = Ki mod n1
will not be revealed even to the device owner. In Chien’s
scheme [10], ki,t = H(Ki ⊕ wt) follows the decoupled struc-
ture and the tamper-resistant device is also assumed, but Ki
is distributed in the clear to the user upon registration. This
observation helps understand Yi’s attack. Although in [12]
Yi again did not propose any remedy, a security fix can be
made in a straightforward manner, also based on the above
observation. That is, during the registration of a user enti-
tled to I(i, t1, t2), Ki should also be securely embedded in the
issued tamper-resistant device, just like the way X, Ht1 (a),
or Hz−t2 (b) is stored. Such a slight modification to distribut-
ing the base class key makes the security diﬀerence, as this
way Ki and wt in (2) are fully decoupled. It also makes the
time-bound hierarchical KA scheme more user-friendly, as
the device owner no longer needs to input Ki for session key
derivation. Note that it is prohibitively diﬃcult for human
beings to bear in mind a cryptographic key (randomly gen-
erated by the CA according to [10]).
Essentially, Yi’s collusion attack [12] lies in the mis-
use of the tamper-resistant device, which is deceived into
believing that the derived class key is always of a lower
security class than the device owner’s base class. Hence
alternatively, Chien’s scheme [10] can be repaired by pre-
venting users from entering crafted references like the r′bc in
Sect. 4.2. For example, if ri j on the public board is changed
to an encrypted form, say EX(ri j‖IDi), the tamper-resistant
device can employ the server secret key X and the readonly
public identifier IDi to reliably retrieve an authenticated ri j.
Three similar lightweight remedies have been presented in
[13]. However, securely embedding Ki (along with other
secrets) into the tamper-resistant device should be the most
convenient, as it incurs the slightest modification and user-
friendliness as a bonus.
Recently, a heavyweight remedy to Chien’s
scheme [10] was proposed by Bertino et al. [14], where
the tamper-resistant device is additionally required to sup-
port elliptic-curve cryptography so as to defend against Yi’s
three-party collusion attack [12]. Essentially, the scheme by
Bertino et al. [14] is a rewritten (the elliptic-curve edition)
of Chien’s scheme [10], where each of the public references
ri j is generated and then employed using the elliptic-curve
public-key cryptography instead of the cost-eﬃcient one-
way hash function. Unfortunately, recently Sun et al. [16]
showed that, aside from the increased computational over-
head, the rewritten scheme [14] appears to be even more
vulnerable than the original one [10]; merely two conspir-
ators are enough to misuse the tamper-resistant device to
infer unauthorized session keys. Simple fix to the rewritten
scheme is also suggested in [16], which still reduces to the
authentication on ri j and thus directly applies to the origi-
nal Chien’s scheme [10] (without necessarily involving the
expensive elliptic-curve cryptography).
Finally, compared with Tzeng’s scheme [4], Chien’s
scheme [10] seems more promising, as expensive com-
putations like modular exponentiation and the Lucas se-
quence have both been replaced with cost-eﬃcient opera-
tions (mainly one-way hash functions). Chien’s scheme is
also eﬃcient in terms of storage and communication; the
user private primitive incurs constant storage cost, and the
needed public parameters {ri j} are of the same size with the
number of direct edges in the DAG representing the partial-
order hierarchy. Note that such |{ri j}| usually scales as O(m)
(e.g., |{ri j}| = 10 in Fig. 1, where m = 8), and thus is compa-
rable to Tzeng’s scheme [4]. In case m is not large, it is pos-
sible to store all these public parameters on the user’s device.
The only issue seems to be that, Chien’s scheme is based on
a tamper-resistant device (in which the user base class key
Ki should be securely embedded). However, note that the
remedy for Tzeng’s scheme [4] to thwart the collusion at-
tack [8] also asks for the protection by a tamper-resistant de-
vice (recall Sect. 3.3). Therefore, for real adoption, Chien’s
scheme [10] is more promising than Tzeng’s [4].
5. Conclusions
In this paper the topic of time-bound hierarchical key assign-
ment is concerned. We surveyed the recent literature and
looked into two representative schemes by Tzeng [4] and
Chien [10] as case studies. Collusion attacks have shown to
be a major threat to time-bound hierarchical KA schemes.
Secure building blocks do not always lead to an integration
that is overall secure, and complexity may not necessarily
help with security.
Both schemes [4], [10] can be remedied to withstand
known collusion attacks. The point is to follow a decoupled
structure ki,t = H(Ki,wt) on a tamper-resistant user device,
where Ki and wt should be inaccessible to even the device
owner so as to prevent interweaving attacks. Moreover, in
Tzeng’s [4] and other schemes that follow the Akl-Taylor
style key assignment [3], the assigned exponents do not nec-
essarily need to be primes, but they should be pairwise rela-
tively prime.
Due to cost considerations, existent time-bound hierar-
chical KA schemes may not be readily applicable to com-
modity (particularly, low-cost) devices that neither aﬀord
heavy computation nor have tamper-resistant casing. More
studies are needed in order to find eﬃcient and practical KA
solutions.
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